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Current Civil Rights Problems in the
Collective Bargaining Process: The
Bethlehem & AT&T Experiences
William J. Kilberg*
The affirmative action mandate of Executive Order 11,246, as
amended,' together with the enforcement of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642 and the Equal Pay Act of 19633 have resulted in
a substantial alteration of the employment practices among the
nation's employers. The abolition of overt discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national origin is nearing reality. The current thrust of the federal government's effort to end
employment discrimination has turned to more subtle forms of discrimination which, although often lacking a discriminatory purpose
or intent, nevertheless have the effect of perpetuating the results of
past discriminatory practices. Pursuant to the affirmative action
mandate, the federal equal employment opportunity agencies have,
through a mutual effort, hammered out negotiated settlements and
judicial decisions that have put an end to many such discriminatory
employment practices. However, in the process of enforcing nondiscriminatory hiring and treatment of employees, many legal problems have arisen regarding the traditional law of labor relations and
the collective bargaining process.
This article explores the development, theory, and design of the
government's Contract Compliance Program 4 and the other statutory means of pursuing equal employment opportunity. Part I is a
brief explanation of the Contract Compliance Program under Executive Order 11,246. Part II presents a discussion of the legal underpinnings of the affirmative action concept. Part III deals with the
5 a landmark
decision In the Matter of Bethlehem Steel Corporation,
* Solicitor of Labor, United States Department of Labor; Member, New York and
District of Columbia Bars. B.S. 1966, Cornell; J.D. 1969, Harvard. The author wishes to note
his deep gratitude for the many contributions to this article made by Mr. Terry Yellig,
Attorney, Division of Labor Relations & Civil Rights, Office of the Solicitor of Labor.
1. 3 C.F.R. 173-81 (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000 et seq. (1970).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
4. See notes 8-16 infra and accompanying text.
5. 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 5128 (OFCC Docket No. 102-68, Jan. 15,1973).
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administrative hearing under procedures established by the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance, and the American Telephone &
Telegraph Company Memorandum of Agreement and Consent Decree,' which has been described as "the largest and most impressive
civil rights settlement in the history of the nation."' Part IV attempts to discuss some recent decisions in labor relations that have
been profoundly affected by the Bethlehem and AT&T cases. Finally, this article concludes that the affirmative action concept has
the full support of the federal government and that, despite the
many legal issues which have arisen and which will develop in the
future, the commitment to equal employment opportunity will be
actively pursued while still maintaining a sensitivity to the valid
interests of the parties to collective-bargaining agreements.
I.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

11,246

The goal of Executive Order 11,246 is the attainment of equal
opportunity in the employment practices of employers who are parties to contracts with the federal government.' The Executive Order
provides that those entering into contracts with the federal government or performing work on federally-assisted construction contracts9 agree by contract stipulation that they will not discriminate
against an employee or applicant for employment with respect to
such factors as race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.,* The
Order requires that as a condition of doing business with the government, contractors, subcontractors, and those 'performing work on
federally-assisted construction contracts will take "affirmative action"" to insure that applicants are employed and that employees
are treated without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national
6. The provisions of the Consent Decree are reported at 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE
1860 at 1533-3 to 1533-14 (1973).
7. Quoting the Introduction to the opinion in EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Civil
No. 73-149 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 1973).
8. Executive Order 11,246 has been held to have the force and effect of a statute enacted
by the Congress. See Farkas v. Texas Instr. Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 977 (1967); Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
9. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.3(k) (1973) defines federally-assisted construction contracts as:
"any agreement or modification thereof between any applicant and a person for construction
work which is paid for in whole or in part with funds obtained from the Government or
borrowed on the credit of the Government pursuant to any Federal program involving a grant,
contract, loan, insurance, or guarantee, or undertaking pursuant to any Federal program
involving such grant, contract, loan, insurance, or guarantee, or any application or modification thereof approved by the Government for a grant, contract, loan, insurance, or guarantee
under which the applicant itself participates in the construction work."
10. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 174 (1973).
11. Id.
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origin. As a result, the affirmative action concept requires that employers seeking to do business with the federal government must do
more than merely refrain from discriminatory practices and policies. They must take positive, result-oriented steps toward the elim12
ination of employment barriers to minorities and women.
The Executive Order places the responsibility for administration of its provisions upon the Secretary of Labor and, with the
exception of his responsibility for issuing rules and regulations of
general application,' 3 allows the Secretary to delegate his functions
and duties to others. The day-to-day administration of the Executive Order program is handled through the Department of Labor's
Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC).' 4 The Office has
assigned compliance responsibility for specific industries to fifteen
compliance agencies, each agency having compliance responsibility
for those industries with which it is most familiar.' 5 In the construction industry, the compliance agency for each project is the contracting agency, except for projects in Alaska, where the Interior
Department has overall compliance responsibility. The compliance
agencies in each area conduct investigations, compliance reviews,
and conciliation efforts, hold hearings, and impose sanctions under
the ongoing guidance and supervision of the OFCC.
Remedies and relief available for noncompliance with the requirements of the Executive Order and its implementing procedures
and regulations include suspension, cancellation, and termination
of contracts, as well as debarment of contractors from receiving any
additional federal contracts, subcontracts, or federally-assisted construction contracts.' 6 In addition, the Secretary of Labor may recommend to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) and the Attorney General that legal proceedings under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be instituted against the
parties. The OFCC and its compliance agencies may also negotiate
settlement agreements with noncomplying contractors under which
12. See Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970); Contractors Ass'n of E.
Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Trustees of Tufts College v. Volpe Constr. Co., 3 F.E.P.
Cases 34 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1970); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio
Misc. 289, 238 N.E.2d 839 (Ohio C.P.), afl'd, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1969).
13. Exec. Order. No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 174 (1973).
14. Secretary of Labor Order No. 26-65, 31 Fed. Reg. 6921 (1966).
15. See Order No. 1, John L. Wilks, Director, Office of Federal Contract Compliance,
Consolidation and Reassignment of Compliance Agency Responsibility (Oct. 24, 1969).
16. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 177-78 (1973).
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the latter agree to remedy existing deficiencies, including the modification of seniority systems, increased minority and female participation at various job levels, and back pay provisions to remedy past
discrimination.
Thus, the Contract Compliance Program uses the government's
procurement process to require equal employment opportunity by
federal contractors and subcontractors and federally-assisted construction contractors and subcontractors. The thrust of the Program
is to increase the utilization of minorities and women throughout
the employer's work force pursuant to nondiscrimination and affirmative action objectives.
I.

LEGAL BASIS FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE CONTRACT
COMPLIANCE PROGRAM

The Department of Labor's position on equal employment opportunity emphasizes the legitimate concern of the government to
ensure that the manpower needs of the nation are met. It is a privilege, rather than a right, to conduct business with the government.
It is entirely proper, and perhaps constitutionally required,,7 for the
federal government to exact from persons who do business with it
contract stipulations not to discriminate against employees and job
applicants and to take affirmative action to insure that applicants
are employed and that employees are treated during employment
without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Although the Executive Order program ha's been in effect with
various degrees of efficacy since 1941,18 its potential was not realized
until the late 1960's.' 9 It was in the latter part of the last decade that
the federal government determined to give definition to the vague
affirmative action mandate. Because of its visibility, the obvious
disparity in job opportunities, and the unique aspect of a somewhat
transient workforce, the construction industry was viewed as a target.
A number of approaches were tried by the government. The St.
Louis Plan, issued by the Department of Labor in 1966, required
17. See NAACP v. Brennan, 5 F.E.P. Cases 1239 (D.D.C. 1973); Ethridge v. Rhodes,
268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Todd v. Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 223 F. Supp. 12
(N.D. Ill. 1963), vacated as moot, 332 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914
(1965); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 238 N.E.2d 839
(Ohio C.P.), aff'd, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004
(1969); cf. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
18. See Exec. Order No. 8,802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (Comp. 1938-1943).
19. See generally Nash, Affirmative Action Under Executive Order 11,246, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 225 (1971).
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federal agencies to conduct pre-award employment opportunity
compliance reviews with the contractor with a minimum of guidance or prescribed standards. This was followed by the San Francisco Bay Area Plan, which detailed pre-award procedures for agencies to follow, but embodied no standards by which agencies could
qualify employers. The Cleveland Plan of 1967 soon followed and
introduced the use of so-called manning tables. 0 The Plan required
post-award negotiations with successful bidders over minority employment.' The original Philadelphia Plan 2 followed the Cleveland
Plan and incorporated many of its features, including the postaward negotiation of minority employment figures. The Comptroller
General of the United States attacked the Philadelphia Plan, however, as violative of procurement law considerations because it
lacked specificity by leaving the determinations of minority manpower utilization open for post-award negotiations.2 As a result of
this opinion, the revised Philadelphia Plan of 1969 was issued.
The revised Plan was carefully drafted to satisfy the Comptroller General's objections to its predecessor. No post-award negotiations were authorized. Instead, numerical ranges for minority manpower utilization were set up by the government prior to the invitation for bids. In formulating the ranges, the government examined
and evaluated such factors as the current extent of minority participation in the trades, the availability of minorities for placement, the
extent of available training and the need for training, and the impact of the-Plan on the existing labor force. Currently, the ranges
are included with all bid invitations for projects covered by the
Plan, and it is within these ranges that a participating bidder selects
his goal. This allows the government to measure his efforts in taking
affirmative action during performance under the awarded contract.
If the goal is met, he is presumed to be in compliance; if the goal is
not reached, the contractor is given the opportunity to demonstrate
that he made a good faith effort to reach the goal.
The Comptroller General charged that the revised Philadelphia
20. A manning table is a specific proposal in which the contractor details the total
number of employees he will use in each trade and how many of that number will constitute
his "goal" of minority employment. The manning table concept provided a simple standard
by which progress toward equal employment could be measured easily.
21. The validity of the procedure was upheld in Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 15 Ohio Misc. 289, 238 N.E.2d 839 (Ohio C.P.), afld, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E.2d
907 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1969).
22. The original plan was known as the Philadelphia Pre-Award Plan and was put into
effect on November 30, 1967.
23. 48 COMP. GEN. 326 (1968).
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Plan's special treatment of minorities violated the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, although he admitted that his prior objections regarding
procurement law considerations had been met.2 4 The Attorney General, however, in response to the Department of Labor's request for
informal advice, rendered an opinion supporting the legality of the
Plan. 5 The Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers subsequently held hearings on the Plan, alleging that it represented a
violation of the separation of powers mandate of the Constitution.
In December, 1969 the Senate attached a rider attacking the Philadelphia Plan to a supplemental appropriation bill. The rider, designed to allow the Comptroller General to veto the Plan, failed in
a late evening, pre-Christmas vote.
After the effort to kill the revised Philadelphia Plan via administrative and legislative processes had failed, the Plan was challenged in the courts. In ContractorsAssociation of EasternPennsyl2
vania v. Secretary of Labor,'
a federal district court and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals both determined that the Plan was consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. In that
case, the plaintiff Association contended that the Plan constituted
illegal and unconstitutional executive action because it was drawn
without authorization from Congress. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the record keeping and hiring practices required by
the Plan violated Pennsylvania lawn without the benefit of statutory or constitutional authority for the executive action. They contended that without such statutory or constitutional authority, no
substantive federal requirements could be imposed upon a contract
between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and its contractors.
The Court of Appeals replied that the Plan was but a refined approach to the affirmative action requirements of the Executive
Order program beginning in 1941,28 and:
24. Op. CoMP. GEN. No. B-163026, 115 CONG. REc. 17,201-04 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1969)
(Letter to Secretary of Labor, George P. Shultz, Aug. 5, 1969).
25. 42 Op. ATr'y GEN. 37 (1969).
26. 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afi'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971).
27. 442 F.2d at 166. The court noted that "[t]he Pennsylvania Human Relations Act,
43 P.S. § 951 et seq. (Supp. 1970), specifically prohibits an employer from keeping any record
of or using any form of application with respect to the race, color, religion, ancestry, sex, or
national origin of an applicant for employment. 43 P.S. § 955(b)(1). The Act also prohibits
the use of a quota system for employment based on the same criteria. 43 P.S. § 955(b)(3).
The record-keeping prohibition may be of limited force due to certain requirements of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c). Moreover, we do not know how
the Pennsylvania courts or the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission would react to a
scheme of 'benign' quota hiring." Id. at n.14.
28. 442 F.2d at 170.
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[wihile the orders do not contain any specific statutory reference other than
the appropriations statute, 31 U.S.C. § 690, they would seem to be authorized
by the broad grant of procurement authority with respect to Titles 40 and 41.2

The court concluded that Congress had granted sufficient procurement authority to the executive branch to enable it to carry out the
Plan.
The plaintiffs further contended that the Plan was inconsistent
with several sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.30
After holding that the restrictive language contained in sections
703(j) 3 and 703(h)3 2 of the Act are limitations only upon Title VII,
not upon any other remedies, state or federal, the appellate court
turned to plaintiffs' contention that the Plan, by imposing remedial
quotas, required them to violate the basic prohibitions of Section
703(a), which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire ... any individual ... because of such individual's race

(2) to ...

. .

.

or

classify his employees in any way which would deprive ...

individual of employment opportunities ...

any

because of such individual's race

33

The court stated that while the Plan does require a certain color
consciousness, it does not thereby require or authorize discrimination against white craftsmen in the affected trades. In an order
dated September 23, 1969,'3 the Department of Labor made findings
that contractors could commit themselves to specific employment
goals without adversely affecting the existing labor force. Therefore,
minority persons could be recruited without eliminating job opportunities for white craftsmen. Thus, the court held that the revised
Philadelphia Plan does not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The court also noted that the Plan does not violate section 8(f)
29.
30.

Id.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1970).
31. Id. § 7030), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) provides: "Nothing contained in this
subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer ... [or] labor organization ... to
grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race ... of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race... employed. . . in comparison with the total
number of [sic] percentage of persons of such race ... in the available work force in any
community ...

or other area."

32. Id. § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system.
33. Id. § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
34. The revised Philadelphia Plan was implemented like a 2-staged rate making process. See BNA-FEP 401:251 (Order of June 27, 1969), and 401:255 (Order of Sept. 23, 1969).
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of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),35 which permits exclusive hiring hail arrangements in the construction industry. Paragraph 8(b) of a June 27, 1969 Department of Labor order" provides
that:
It is no excuse that the union with which the contractor has a collective bargaining agreement failed to refer minority employees. Discrimination in referral for employment, even if pursuant to provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement, is prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is the longstanding uniform policy of OFCC
that contractors and subcontractors have a responsibility to provide equal
employment opportunity if they want to participate in Federally-involved contracts. To the extent they have delegated the responsibility for some of their
employment practices to some other organization or agency which prevents
them from meeting their obligations pursuant to Executive Order 11246, ...
such contractors cannot be considered to be in compliance with [the] Executive Order ....

Plaintiffs contended that this language violates the NLRA by interfering with the exclusive hiring hall arrangements that the contractors have with unions pursuant to collective-bargaining agreements.
The court found it legally irrelevant that the contractor might be
compelled to look outside the union for employees, speculating that
it is entirely likely that the economics of the market place will
produce an accommodation between the contract provisions desired
by the unions and those desired by the source of construction
funds. 37 The decision indicates that contractors are faced with the
choice of undertaking a commitment to affirmative action or losing
opportunities to bid on federally assisted work. The court viewed the
dilemma of the contractors as merely a contradiction between contractual undertakings, rather than a violation of the NLRA.38
Finally, the court held that the Plan's specified goals were not
racial quotas being imposed upon individuals by the government.
Instead, the court viewed the program as a valid executive action
designed to remedy a perceived evil-that minority tradesmen have
not been included in the available labor pool for construction projects in which the federal government has an interest. The conclusion was that such action was not prohibited by the fifth amendment. 9
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1970).
36. BNA-FEP, 401:251 (Order of June 27, 1969).
37. 442 F.2d at 174.
38. So, too, the court dismissed the contention that the Plan could be attacked on the
grounds that the plaintiffs were being forced to take action to remedy what is really union
discrimination. Id. at 174.
39. Id. at 176-77.
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The decision by the Third Circuit indicates that to the extent
that the requirements of law change subsequent to the execution of
a contract by the parties, the contract is nevertheless subject to the
prevailing law. The court stated that present seniority and hiring
hall practices, racially neutral on their face, may nevertheless be
avoided if their effect is to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination, regardless of whether such past discrimination was intentionally caused. The implications of this aspect of the appellate decision
on the government's ability to enforce the affirmative action requirements of Title VII and Executive Order 11,246 will be explored
further in the discussion of the Bethlehem and AT&T cases.
The holding in Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania provides legal support for the concept of goals and timetables
in minority recruitment as a means of implementing the affirmative
action mandate of Executive Order 11,246. Such measures were
required by the regulations issued by the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance" to facilitate prompt achievement of full and equal
employment opportunity for minorities and women where they
might prove useful in overcoming deficiencies in their employment.
The court's ruling that the submission of minority utilization goals
and timetables falls within the ambit of the affirmative action mandate of Executive Order 11,246 also holds that they do not constitute
unlawful quotas." The result is that the government's approach to
the affirmative action mandate of the Executive Order became a
solid foundation from which the government could seek to defeat
discrimination in employment.

III. Bethlehem

AND

AT&T EXPLORED: THE CONCEPTS IN ACTION

Using the concept of minority employment goals and timeta40. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1 et seq. (1973).
41. The decision has broader implications beyond the construction industry, particularly since nonconstruction contractors are also required to submit goals and timetables which
express the contractor's reasonable expectations as to his good faith efforts to make his
affirmative action program work. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1973) details the procedures and guidelines to be used by nonconstruction contractors in developing written affirmative action
programs. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 states:
An acceptable affirmative action program must . . . include goals and timetables to
which the contractor's good faith efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies and,
thus to increase materially the utilization of minorities and women, at all levels and in
all segments of his work force where deficiencies exist. (emphasis added).
Concerning the reasonableness of the goals, 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(e) states: "Goals may
not be rigid and inflexible quotas which must be met, but must be targets reasonably attainable by means of applying every good faith effort to make all aspects of the entire affirmative
action program work."
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bles, the Department of Labor is requesting prospective contractors
to review their personnel policies, practices, and procedures to ensure that they are fair and valid, to take affirmative action to increase the relevant pool of available labor from which they recruit
and promote, and to make good faith efforts to meet these goals and
timetables. It would be inconsistent, however, to recognize the necessity of remedying the underutilization of minorities and women
without meeting the concomitant need to remedy the effects of past
discrimination. It is clear that affirmative action to remedy the
current underutilization of minorities and women, without more,
may not be an effective remedy for the victims of past discrimination.
2
The Secretary of Labor's decision In re Bethlehem Steel Corp.1
and the Memorandum of Agreement and Consent Decree signed by
the Department of Labor, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and the Department of Justice with the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company 3 are significant in the development of adequate relief for the victims of past patterns of discrimination. Both employers had a history of individual employee complaints; both AT&T and Bethlehem were found in violation of the
Executive Order in compliance reviews; and neither had submitted,
prior to the initiation of administrative procedures, effective corrective action plans to remedy the equal employment deficiencies at
issue. The relief afforded in each case will deeply affect both employment programs at other companies and the collectivebargaining process generally.
A.

The Bethlehem Case

The initial question in Bethlehem was whether the company,
at its Sparrows Point, Maryland plant, had initially hired and assigned employees to particular jobs, units, and departments on a
racial basis. A hearing panel and, subsequently, the Secretary concurred in the finding that blacks had been hired into all- or
predominantly-black departments with less desirable and lower
paying jobs than those given to white employees. The investigators
then attempted to determine whether the effects of that discrimination had later been remedied by the company. The panel found, and
the Secretary again affirmed, that the company had not taken suffi42. 1 CCH EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE 5128 (OFCC Docket No. 102-68, Jan. 15, 1973).
43. The American Telephone and Telegraph Company signed the Agreement on behalf
of itself and its associated telephone companies.
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cient affirmative steps to remedy the effects of its past discrimination in regard to those employees originally hired and placed into
"black" jobs.
Bethlehem had opened up the formerly "white" lines of progression to black employees, offering them an opportunity to transfer whenever a vacancy occurred. The employee opting to transfer,
however, would have to begin at the entry level position in the new
unit, sacrificing the pay he formerly earned for the standard pay of
the new job. Perhaps even more significantly, the transferring employee was forced to sacrifice his seniority in the old unit, regardless
of how long he had been employed at Sparrows Point, and to begin
accumulating seniority anew in the transfer unit. Thus the black
employee, who had been denied an opportunity to work and compete for promotions in those units in the past, had the same status
as a new employee beginning the same job on the same day.
A major problem for the Secretary was to prescribe a remedy
for the discrimination suffered by both blacks who had already
transferred and incurred such losses and those who had not transferred because of the hardships,. Accordingly, the elements of relief
ordered by the Secretary for the affected class-black employees
hired and initially assigned to predominantly black departments on
or before March 31, 1968-include:
1. The company will offer to each employee who has not transferred out of a predominantly black department the opportunity, in
writing, to do so.
2. Employees requesting transfers into predominantly white
departments with better advancement opportunities will compete
for vacancies as they become available on the basis of total plant
service.
3. When employees transferred in accordance with the Decree
compete for promotions in their new unit, all employees in that unit
must compete on the basis of total plant seniority. Plant seniority
also controls in bumping less senior employees in case of layoff. This
is necessary because the Sparrows Point plant operated on the standard system of basing promotions solely on unit and department
seniority.
4. All employees who transfer under the Order will be paid
"red-circled" wages until such time as their pay in the new job
equals their wages in their former job. This means that they will be
paid either at the rate nearest to their average earnings in their old
departments or at the appropriate scale, including incentives, shift
differential, and overtime, in the new job, whichever is higher.
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5. No employee need be transferred if he does not have the
basic skills to perform the requested job and could not be so
equipped with minimal training. The Order also calls for the establishment of minimum periods of residency in certain jobs which, in
a given progression line, would provide necessary training and experience for the next higher job.
6. Employees who have transferred previously at the sacrifice
of pay and seniority are to be given the same red circle pay remedy
and plant seniority privileges as those who elect to transfer under
this decree.
The Bethlehem decision will have a major immediate effect on
the seniority system at the Sparrows Point installation. Similar
seniority modifications have been ordered by the courts for Bethlehem's Lackawanna, New York plant" and United States Steel's
Fairfield, Alabama plant. 5 The Secretary's decision grants to the
affected class members the seniority they would have had in the new
jobs if the jobs had originally been available to them. The remedies
devised under the Order, however, are utilized only when traditional
practices would be discriminatory. For example, plant seniority
comes into play only when a person in the affected class is competing for a job in a unit to which he has transferred. Traditional
contract seniority will continue to be controlling when white employees compete with each other or with black employees who are
not members of the affected class for promotions, layoff, and recall.
B. The AT&T Case
The Bethlehem case did not deal with issues concerning
women, professionals, or managerial personnel, and it did not require back pay for those whose earnings over the years had been
lessened by discrimination. These issues, however, were firmly addressed in the AT&T Memorandum of Agreement and Consent Decree involving remedial relief under Executive Order 11,246, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.46
The settlement negotiated with AT&T covers all of its twenty-four
operating companies and is unique in that it provides back pay for
over 13,000 women and 2,000 minority men, establishes specific
remedial steps for the upgrading of all qualified college-trained
44.
F. Supp.
45.
1973).
46.

United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971), modifying 312
977 (W.D.N.Y. 1970).
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 5 F.E.P. Cases 1253 (N.D. Ala. May 2,
29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970).
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women, and increases present salaries of persons whose earnings are*
less than they would have been but for prior discrimination in job
placement. Moreover, since the settlement was incorporated into a
federal consent decree, it has the force of law and remains enforceable by the courts.
The primary provisions of the Agreement are:
1. The Bell companies will develop goals for increasing the
utilization of women and minorities in each job classification at all
of the 700 establishments within the Bell system and will set specific
hiring and promotion targets for those groups. These targets will be
under constant review by the operating companies, AT&T headquarters, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance, and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.
2. The companies will establish goals for the employment of
males in the previously all female job category of telephone operator.
3. The companies will take the necessary steps to assure that
their transfer and promotion procedures are in compliance with the
Equal Pay Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and Executive Order
11,246. Back pay will be awarded to women who have been paid less
than men for substantially equal work.
4. Women and minorities in nonmanagement, noncraft jobs
will compete for entry-level craft jobs upon the attainment of basic
qualifications and seniority. Competition for higher-paying craft
jobs will also be facilitated.
5. The companies agree not to use the results of preemployment tests that have not been validated to the satisfaction
of the government as a justification for failure to meet their employment goals, but reserve the right to use validated tests to help determine qualifications of prospective employees.
6. Employees who are promoted will be paid in their new positions on the basis of their total length of service with the companies,
subject to some limitations due to lack of experience in more skilled
occupations.
7. All female college graduates hired into management between July 2, 1965, the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
and December 31, 1971, will be assessed to determine their interest
and potential for higher-level jobs. A special development program
will prepare these women for promotions as they become available.
8. All employees will be encouraged to seek promotions and
will be informed of the Agreement's provisions and of the vacancies
and promotions under the Agreement which take place in their re-
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spective establishments.
9. A number of pay adjustments will also be made by the
companies involved. Chief among them are: first, approximately
3,000 women presently employed in craft jobs but earning less than
their male counterparts will receive retroactive pay adjustments
covering a period up to two years; second, women presently employed in craft jobs who are not yet at their maximum rate of pay
will receive immediate wage increases to conform to the Agreement;
third, wage rates for 500 switchroom helpers employed by Michigan
Bell-mostly women-will be raised into line with what is paid for
comparable work in other Bell companies and retroactive pay adjustments will be made for a period of up to two years; fourth, to
provide restitution for possible delays in promotion, the companies
have agreed to make lump sum payments ranging from $100 to $400
to at least 10,000 women and minorities promoted from noncraft
jobs into craft jobs between June 30, 1971, and July 1, 1974, provided they remain in the new jobs a minimum of 6 months; and
finally, women college graduates hired directly into management
who qualify under the telephone companies' new assessment program will receive a $100 a month raise as soon as they qualify.
C. Analysis of the Cases
Bethlehem was the first decision under Executive Order 11,246
providing meaningful relief for an affected class of employees by
establishing a plant-wide seniority system in partial substitution for
a unit or departmental seniority system that had perpetuated prior
discrimination. The Secretary recognized that full relief would require providing these individuals an opportunity to move into their
rightful place-where they would have been but for the employer's
initial discrimination in job assignment. 7 In the AT&T Memorandum of Agreement and Consent Decree, following on the heels of the
Bethlehem decision, the government here too was able to grasp a
new dimension of relief for women and minority workers and further expand it to include back pay. Moreover, the result suggests
some new legal concepts being utilized in the process, particularly
the concept of restitution for delay in promotion."
A critical aspect of the relief obtained in the Bethlehem deci47. See Note, Title VII, Seniority Discrimination,and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HAuv.
L. REv. 1260, 1263-66 (1967).
48. See p. 96 infra for an explanation of the terms "would have been" and "should
have been" used to describe the group of employees who suffered the effects of discriminatory
personnel policies, practices, and procedures.
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sion was the determination of the affected class. The concept of
providing remedial relief for members of an "affected class" has
been applied by the courts in numerous Title VII cases" and the
Secretary relied upon this same approach to identify those minority
group employees who were suffering the present effects of past discrimination at the company. The Office of Federal Contract Compliance proposed that all black employees be included in the affected class unless and until the company established a different
class. The Secretary, reviewing the evidence, found this proposal to
be inappropriate. Instead, he determined that the affected class
should consist of those black employees working at Sparrows Point
who were hired prior to the company's liberalized transfer policy
instituted March 31, 1968,50 and were initially assigned to all-black
or predominantly-black departments. The Secretary noted that
there was no evidence presented that supported a conclusion that
the company's former overt discrimination had not been effectively
eliminated or that employees hired since March 31, 1968, have not
been accorded equal opportunity.
The AT&T negotiations, however, presented a more difficult
problem in identifying the members of the affected class. The government contended that the primary affected class was women and
minorities who in the past were unlawfully assigned to traditionally
female or minority job classifications, in the operator and service
categories. Other affected classes that the government included
were: applicants rejected on the basis of unlawful criteria; incumbent employees whose transfer requests were rejected on the basis
of unlawful criteria; and all females and minorities who had transferred to craft jobs and whose craft wages were not based solely on
net-credited service. AT&T representatives refused to accept the
term "affected class" as an accurate description of those employees
whom the government regarded as entitled to relief and financial
restitution. Rather, the company insisted on referring to these em49. See, e.g., United States v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 471 F.2d 582 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 444 F.2d 687 (5th Cir.
1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th
Cir. 1969), affg 282 F. Supp. 39 (E.D. La. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970); Quarles
v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
50. On March 14, 1968, the company and the union signed a Memorandum of Understanding which liberalized qualifications and length of service conditions to transfer into a
different department. In addition, the company submitted to the OFCC an affirmative action
program on March 25, 1968.
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ployees in the less incriminating terms of the "would have beens"
and the "should have beens"-those persons who, but for prior company personnel policies, practices, or procedures, would have been
or should have been in other jobs. Regardless of the labels used,
AT&T was correct in its argument that the government could not
accurately identify those groups of employees who by virtue of past
discrimination continued to suffer the present effects of that discrimination.
Faced with this dilemma, the government proceeded on the
premise that although the identity of the affected class was not
readily ascertainable, some percentage of these employees had been
denied equality of opportunity for advancement to the higher paying craft jobs. Therefore, the government agencies negotiating with
AT&T avoided the problem of defining precisely an affected class
by utilizing the definition of the "would have beens" and the
"should have beens" in the company's affirmative action program.
The development of an affirmative action program requires
an analysis of areas within which the contractor is deficient in the utilization
of minority groups and women, and further, goals and timetables to which the
contractor's good faith efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies and,
thus to increase materially the utilization of minorities and women, at all
levels and in all segments of his work force where deficiencies exist.2

Pursuant to the kind of analysis called for in the regulations of the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance, 52 the government determined that it was reasonable to expect that AT&T would have a
rate of attrition and expansion of job opportunities sufficient to
absorb the transfer of approximately 10,000 women and minorities
from operator and clerical jobs into entry-level craft jobs over a two
year time period on the basis of minimum qualifications and seniority. In order to encourage and facilitate the transfer of the "would
have beens" and the "should have beens," a comparability study
was conducted to determine the existing pay rates of these employees and what they would have been earning if they were employed
in craft positions. The total dollar amount was then spread out over
the projected 10,000 women and minority transferees from noncraft, nonmanagement jobs into craft jobs. The result was that those
who transferred into craft jobs in the first six months after the
Agreement would get a lump sum payment of $100, those who transfer in the second six months would get a lump sum payment of $200,
in the third six months $300, and in the fourth six months $400.
51.
52.

41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1973).
Id. § 60-2.11.
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Thus there was an incentive for the affected female and minority
employees to transfer to the higher-paying craft jobs and a concomitant incentive for AT&T to transfer these employees since the speed
of the transfers determined the cost incurred by the company. In
addition to the incentive factor, the escalating payment formula
contained in the Memorandum of Agreement involved some equitable considerations in that those employees who transferred later
deserved a greater sum of money as compensation than those employees who suffered the effect of AT&T's discriminatory personnel
policies and practices for a shorter time before being transferred to
craft jobs.
Another notable aspect of the Memorandum of Agreement is
the variety of legal theories that led to the resolution of a large equal
pay problem. The vast majority of employees of AT&T worked in
sex-segregated job classifications; taking all of the organization's
operating companies together, males constituted 98.6 per cent of all
AT&T craft workers on December 31, 1971, while 96.6 per cent of
all office and clerical employees were women.13 During the last few
years before the Agreement, AT&T permitted a handful of women
to transfer to craft jobs, which transfer entailed, as it did for men,
a refiguring of the wage rate for the individual. There are a variety
of ways in which the various Bell companies accomplish this, but
all methods operate on the same principle, namely that the wage
rate in the new job is at least partly determined by the wage rate of
the old job, even though no particular prior experience is required
for the new job. Since men have traditionally had the higher paying
jobs, a man who transfers between craft jobs is paid more than an
equally qualified woman who transfers into the same job." Relief
from the inequities of these discriminatory policies and practices
could have been achieved either under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, or Executive Order 11,246
depending upon the legal theory adopted by the party seeking relief.
53. 'A Unique Competence': A Study of Equal Employment Opportunity in the Bell
System, 118 CoNG. REc. E1243 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 EEOC

Study].
54. Using the not so typical hypothetical described in Appendices I and II, to show the
magnitude of potential liability, assume a male frameman (craft job) and a female operator
each with 72 months of service are simultaneously promoted to the craft job of station
installer. The man will move from $152.50 per week to $156.50; the woman will go from $118
to $124 per week. After 18 months on the job the man would be earning $176, the woman,
$139.50. If each then moves to the top craft job of PBX installer, the man will enter the job
at $183, the woman at $142. Assuming they both stay in the PBX installer job, the woman
w ill receive the top wage 41/ years after the man and will have lost $6,500 during the whole
period.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Title VII and Executive Order 11,246 provide relief for an affected class that is suffering the present effects of past discrimination. AT&T had pursued a practice of discriminatory assignment of
females and minorities to traditionally female or minority job classifications based solely on their sex or race. The company's failure to
identify those employees who were discriminated against by this
sytem of unlawful job assignment and to modify the promotional
wage structure constituted discrimination on the basis of sex and
race since the employees who had been assigned to the lowest paying
jobs would continue to suffer wage discrimination upon transfer,
thereby perpetuating the effects of past discrimination. The Supreme Court has ruled that Title VII prohibits not only overt discrimination, but also practices that are fair on their face but discriminatory in operation." Thus, a promotional wage structure that
on its face is nondiscriminatory, but nevertheless has a discriminatory impact, is unlawful. The same result can be reached under
Executive Order 11,246.56 Therefore, the presence of a sexsegregated work force and a promotional wage structure that perpetuates such discrimination is violative of both Title VII and the
Executive Order.
On the other hand, viewing the AT&T case as an equal pay
action, a somewhat different legal approach would be taken. The
Equal Pay Act prohibits an employer from discriminating "between
employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees. . . at
a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the
opposite sex . . . for equal work . . .which requires equal skill,
effort, and responsibility . . -57 except where such payment is
made pursuant to four excepted situations. 8 The promotional wage
structure in its various forms throughout the Bell System resulted
in women earning wages less than the rate at which male employees
are compensated for substantially equal work. AT&T could not
bring this unequal treatment within any of the exceptions contained
in the Act. The promotional wage plan is not a seniority system, the
first exception, since neither length of employment nor similar timebased indices are used to determine the new wage rate. The primary
55. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56. In re Bethlehem Steel Corp., 1 CCH EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE 1 5128 (OFCC Docket No.
102-68, Jan. 15, 1973).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
58. Id. The 4 exceptions are: "(i) [A] seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential
based on any other factor other than sex. ."
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determinant is simply the number of dollars paid in the preceding
job. Merit, the second exception to the Act, plays no part in determining the amount of increase since all of the systems described
above are applied without regard to individual characteristics.
Quantity or quality of production, the third exception, comes into
play only in the accumulation of credit towards a wage grade within
a job classification and in the decision whether to promote an employee. It does not determine the wage to be paid at various job
classifications.
Under the final catch-all exception to the Act, wage rates determined on a "factor other than sex," the only colorable claim available to AT&T was that prior craft experience is an asset when
transferring to another craft job and that the wage differential between men and women employees is actually payment for this experience. The response to this argument was the company's own personnel position that each job in the Bell system is unique and requires special training. The Bell companies have few prereqtisite
jobs;' indeed, twelve operating companies of the Bell system publicly advertised that for every craft job at every level, employees are
given extended classroom and on the job training." An in-depth
study of Michigan Bell's promotion practices, however, revealed no
set lines of progression, indicating that no job requires any particular kind of previous experience." This is also borne out by the "relevant labor pools" described in AT&T's affirmative action plan submitted to OFCC. 2 The relevant pool for the telephone craft-insideskilled group, for example, includes all inside and outside semiskilled craftworkers and skilled general service workers. The variety
of jobs covered by these three categories is so broad as to preclude
a conclusion that skills learned on these lower jobs are necessary to
the proper performance of the higher.
Even if AT&T could have shown that some common elements
run through all craft jobs and that these common elements must be
acquired by employees before moving on to higher level craft jobs,
this does not constitute a "factor other than sex" because the Bell
System has prevented women employees from gaining these skills
through a variety of discriminatory practices. As was alleged above,
AT&T was violating Title VII and Executive Order 11,246, inter
alia, by means of slanted recruiting, processing differently male and
59.
60.
61.
62.

1972 EEOC Study supra note 53, at E1245.
Id.
See generally 1972 EEOC Study supra note 53.
AT&T Affirmative Action Plan, Addendum XI page 3.
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female job applicants, maintaining sex-segregated job groupings,
and restricting transfers. To recognize the lack of craft experience
on the part of the women as a factor other than sex would be directly
contrary to the policy stated by the Department of Labor that "the
requirements for such an exception are not met unless the factor of
sex provides no part of the basis for the wage differential. "' ' 3 It is
therefore clear that the Equal Pay Act remains a viable vehicle for
ensuring equal employment opportunity, complementing Title VII
and Executive Order 11,246.
A specific example of the interaction of the Title VII-Executive
Order and Equal Pay remedial theories was the government's approach in dealing with a specific problem at Michigan Bell. Michigan Bell had an overwhelming majority of women in the job classification of switchroom helper. At all other companies in the Bell
System this position is a male craft job with the title of frameman
and pays substantially more than the counterpart at Michigan
Bell.6 Section 6(d)(1) of the Equal Pay Act prohibits employers
from discriminating "within any establishment"6 5 between employees on the basis of sex by paying employees of one sex in such
establishment at a rate less than he pays those of the other sex for
equal work. This presented an interesting problem for the government: the Equal Pay Act limits comparison of jobs to those within
a single establishment and could only be applied if Michigan Bell
was considered a component of the single AT&T establishment and
not a company operating separately from the rest of the Bell System. This question is a complex one involving detailed analyses of
the operating practices of each of the Bell companies. Both the law
of tariff regulation and antitrust would be relevant to such a determination. The government attempted to see whether Title VII and
the Executive Order would provide a supportable legal theory to
bring about a clearly equitable result. The difficulty with such an
approach was that remedies for violation of Title VII and the Executive Order have generally pursued a theory of integrating individuals rather than elevating wages of the segregated job. Thus, the
normal remedy would have been to order AT&T to take affirmative
action to provide the switchroom helpers opportunity to transfer
into craft jobs and out of the sex-segregated switchroom helpers
classification. However, the remedy fashioned for these employees
63.
64.
65.

29 C.F.R. § 800.142 (1973).
1972 EEOC Study supra note 53, at E1247.
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1970).
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took a different course. Michigan Bell agreed to raise the wage rates
of its switchroom helpers to a level comparable to the average rate
earned by framemen throughout the Bell System, plus a back pay
provision. What was accomplished was an equal pay remedy under
a Title VII-Executive Order guise. This action opens the possibility
of future challenges to wage structures that, while not violative of
the Equal Pay Act because of jurisdictional limitations, may be the
result of sexual preference."
IV.

IMPLICATIONS OF

Bethlehem

AND

AT&T

ON THE COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING PROCESS

It should be noted that the AT&T Memorandum of Agreement
and Consent Decree stipulates that "[e]ach Bell company agrees
that it will notify all appropriate collective bargaining representatives of the terms of [the] Agreement and of its willingness to
negotiate in good faith concerning these terms. 6' 7 Accordingly,
AT&T's operating companies and their employees' collective bargaining representatives are not restricted from, and are even under
a mandatory duty to, negotiate alternatives to the provisions of the
Agreement-provided that such alternatives are in compliance with
federal law. Remedies such as those fashioned in Bethlehem and
AT&T underscore the government's commitment to meaningful
enforcement of the affirmative action obligations of private contractors under Executive Order 11,246. However, these and similar cases
under Title VII and the Executive Order raise many important
questions concerning the impact of the federal government's involvement in enforcing equal employment opportunity law upon the
collective-bargaining process.
The regulations issued pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 provide for formal sanction proceedings with participation by any labor
organization that is a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement
when the matter is based in whole or in part on matters covered by
the bargaining agreement. 8 These provisions are designed to facilitate union participation in enforcement proceedings concerning the
rights of their members. Clearly, unions have a right to be heard
66. Cf. Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co., 457 F.2d 221 (7th Cir. 1972), where, under the
Equal Pay Act, the court held that a company cannot engage in evasive tactics to avoid
raising a wage rate which had its basis in sex discrimination. Therefore, the jurisdictional
reach of the Equal Pay Act is unquestionably broad.
67. AT&T Memorandum of Agreement and Consent Decree, Part C, Section
VII-Collective Bargaining Agreements, at 31.
68. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.26(b)(1) (1973) and 41 C.F.R. § 60-30.11(a)(1) (1973).
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with regard to their legitimate interest in representing their members. In the AT&T case, the government and the company attempted to deal with this problem by setting up parameters within
which AT&T and the unions representing its employees could negotiate effectively. Essentially, the Memorandum of Agreement and
Consent Decree contains only a general framework of required relief.
So, for example, while the Agreement calls for the partial replacement of department seniority with company seniority, it leaves the
parties to bargain about the imposition of system-wide seniority
provisions." The government set for itself a general policy that it
would not seek anything beyond that which it needed for compliance with the various statutes and the Executive Order, leaving to
the company or to the unions with which it bargains anything that
they could gain in collective bargaining.
The Communications Workers of America (CWA) filed a suit
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania" seeking to intervene as of right in the AT&T Consent
Decree pursuant to Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 The Communications Workers charged that it was not adequately included in the settlement, that its bargaining rights were
violated, and that the Memorandum of Agreement discriminates
against some employees, particularly white males, and would force
the union to discriminate against them as well. The union petitioned the court to suspend its Consent Decree until the Communications Workers and the Bell System companies could reach agreement or until the court determined the issues. The union argued
that since AT&T was alleged to have violated the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and Executive Order 11,246, these statutes conferred upon the CWA an unconditionalright to intervene as a plaintiff under Rule 24(a)(1).
69. System-wide seniority would be viewed as a major step forward to an industrial
union like the Communication Workers; but would be vigorously opposed by a craft union
like The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, which also bargains with the Bell
System.
70. Daily Labor Report, No. 29, F-1 (Feb. 12, 1973).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 provides in part:
(a) Intervention of Right.
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1)
when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; (2) when
the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
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The district court issued an opinion which said, with some
ambiguity, that the CWA can intervene to litigate the limited question of maternity leave only.7 2 The court reviewed the several statutes which could have authorized the full intervention sought by the
union, but determined that neither section 17 of the Fair Labor
Standards Act 73 nor the regulations issued by the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance pursuant to Executive Order 11,246 7 conferred an absolute right to intervene in this suit. Turning its attention to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, however, the court found that
section 706(f) (1) does confer upon "person or persons aggrieved" the
right to intervene where there exists a nexus between a charge filed
by that person or persons with the EEOC and a suit subsequently
filed in the district court by the EEOC. 75 The court found that the
72. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., Civil No. 73-149 (E.D. Pa., Oct. 5, 1973).
73. 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
74. 41 C.F.R. § 60-30.11(a)(1) (1973).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. 1972). If within 30 days after a charge is filed with
the Commission or within 30 days after expiration of any period of reference under subsection

(c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil
action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the charge. In the case of a respondent which is a government, governmental
agency, or political subdivision, if the Commission has been unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission shall take no
further action and shall refer the case to the Attorney General who may bring a civil action
against such respondent in the appropriate United States district court. The person or persons
aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the Commission or
the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision. If a charge filed with the Commission pursuant to subsection (b) of this section
is dismissed by the Commission, or if within 180 days from the filing of such charge or the
expiration of any period of reference under subsection (c) or (d) of this section, whichever is
later, the Commission has not filed a civil action under this section or the Attorney General
has not filed a civil action in a case involving a government, governmental agency, or political
subdivision, or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation agreement to which the
person aggrieved is a party, the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision, shall so notify the person aggrieved and within 90 days after the giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against
the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such
charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges
was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice. Upon application by the complainant and in such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an
attorney for such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without
the payment of fees, costs, or security. Upon timely application, the court may, in its discretion, permit the Commission, or the Attorney General in a case involving a government,
governmental agency, or political subdivision, to intervene in such civil action upon certification that the case is of general public importance. Upon request, the court may, in its
discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than 60 days pending the termination of
state or local proceedings described in subsections (c) or (d) of this section or further efforts
of the Commission to obtain voluntary compliance.
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CWA had taken no action before the EEOC touching on the issues
in the AT&T Memorandum of Agreement and Consent Decree except for AT&T's maternity leave policy. Thus, the union's motion
for intervention under section 706(f) (1) was granted as to maternity
leave but dismissed as to all other issues.
The Communications Workers also asserted that Rule 24(a)(2)
conferred a right of intervention upon parties whose ability to protect their interest was impeded and inadequately represented by the
existing parties. The union relied upon Trbovich v. United Mine
Workers of America,"h in which a union member was allowed to
intervene in a suit instituted by the Secretary pursuant to Title IV
of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
(LMRDA).11 The Secretary's suit sought to set aside an election of
union officials due to violations of the Act. The Supreme Court
upheld the plaintiff's right to intervene despite the LMRDA's provision that a suit by the Secretary of Labor is the exclusive postelection remedy for challenging violations of Title IV. The Court
relied upon the legislative history of the Act to conclude that the
statute imposes a duty on the Secretary to serve two separate interests: the first is to protect the individual union members' rights
against their union; the second is to protect the public interest in
assuring free and democratic union elections. Therefore, the court
held that the union member had a valid complaint about the Secretary's performance in protecting his interests and allowed intervention by the individual member, based upon Rule 24(a)(2).
Unlike Trbovich, however, there is no dual interest in the
A T&T situation. Furthermore, the Memorandum of Agreement and
Consent Decree' provides numerous precautions so as not to prejudice the CWA's rights.18 Thus, the plaintiff was not able to demon76. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481 et seq. (1970).
78. AT&T Memorandum of Agreement and Consent Decree, Part C, section VII states:
This Agreement shall not be interpreted as requiring or permitting the abandonment of any provision in any Bell Company's collective bargaining agreement(s) except
as required-to maintain compliance with Federal law, Executive Orders, and regulations
promulgated pursuant thereto pertaining to discrimination in employment. The government asserts that all of the Bell Companies' obligations in this Agreement are required
for compliance with Federal law; provided, however, that nothing in this Agreement is
intended to restrict the right of the Bell Companies and the collective bargaining representatives of their employees to negotiate alternatives to the provisions of this Agreement which would also be in compliance with Federal law.
To the extent that any Bell Company has in effect, in connection with the promotion
and transfer of employees, a posting and bidding system, or other system, said system
shall continue to be used. Id. at 30-36.
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strate an impairment of its ability to protect its interest unless
permitted to intervene in the litigation. As a result, the CWA was
excluded as a plaintiff except for the limited participation granted
pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Even this limited intervention, however, if read broadly by the court to include matters not
raised by the Agreement, could prove troublesome to the government's ability to enter into final and binding settlements with private parties."
The possibility of any union intervention as party plaintiff in a
case where the employer is a defendant also raises important questions about the employer's ability to counterclaim for contribution
against the union with whom it has a collective-bargaining agreement. In Gilbert v. General Electric Co.," General Electric filed a
counterclaim against the International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers (I.U.E.) for contribution with respect to any
liability that the company might incur for acts or omissions alleged
in a complaint of sex discrimination filed by the plaintiffs. s' General
Electric urged that since the policies alleged to be discriminatory
79. In Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 5 F.E.P. Cases 202 (W.D. N.Y.), rev'd and
remanded, 468 F.2d 1201 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973), 6 black employees
of Bethlehem Steel's Lackawanna plant sought to enjoin the recall of laid off employees on
an alleged racially discriminatory basis. The district court dismissed the motion, citing the
fact that the relief sought was considered but not granted in an earlier case filed by the
Attorney General in U.S. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (Lackawanna) 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971).
However, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded because the Attorney General did not
expressly seek the same relief as the 6 individual plaintiffs were pursuing. Thus, the court
held that for purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel, the private citizen is not bound
by the Attorney General's action if such person or persons were not parties to such action
and do not have interests so as to be in privity with the Attorney General. Furthermore,
inasmuch as the government did not seek the same relief sought by the individual plaintiffs,
the earlier decision did not control the later suit. The court further stated:
While the 1972 amendments [to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] authorize the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to bring a Title VII suit in the name of
the Government, individuals party to Commission conciliation proceedings in the same
action may intervene in such suits, and in those brought by the Attorney General,
[citations omitted] and presumably individuals not party to Commission proceedings
may institute a suit despite any legal action taken by the Commission or the Attorney
General.
Read together, the CWA case and the Williamson case not only permit individuals party
to EEOC conciliation proceedings to intervene in Title VII suits instituted by the government
but also seem to permit individuals not party to such proceedings to institute a separate suit
despite previous litigation by the government. The holdings in these cases might create a
doubt in the minds of defendant employers as to whether entering into settlement agreements
with federal agencies will insulate them from further judicial proceedings concerning the
alleged discriminatory practices which are the gravamen of the settlement agreements.
80. 5 F.E.P. Cases 989 (E.D. Va. 1973).
81. Id. at 990 n.1. The named plaintiffs to this action included the International Union
of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO and Local 161 of that union.
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were bargained for in a collective-bargaining agreement with the
I.U.E., both the company and the union should share responsibility
and contribute equally to the payment of any damages awarded by
the court.
The court denied the union's motion to dismiss on the basis of
Blanton v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 2 and Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co. 3 Blanton involved a complaint of sex discrimination by employees and the union against their employer.
Southern Bell filed a counterclaim similar to General Electric's and,
although the court expressed serious doubts whether Southern Bell
could ultimately prove a right to contribution if found to be liable,
it held that a counterclaim may be brought under theories of either
tort or Title VII or both. Blanton relied upon the Bowe case, which
tacitly held that a union freely a party to a negotiated contract with
illegal provisions may potentially be held as a joint tortfeasor upon
a counterclaim. However, Bowe indicated that the union may not
be held liable if efforts were made by the union to alter the effects
or stop the implementation of alleged discriminatory provisions
after the law became clear. Accordingly, the issue stated by the
court in Gilbert was whether the I.U.E. sought to gain relief for its
members from alleged discriminatory clauses in the contract relating to pregnancy benefits after the issuance of an EEOC decision
holding that disparate treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities
constituted sex discrimination. 4 Pursuant to the principles of law
articulated in Blanton and Bowe, the court denied the union's motion to dismiss the counterclaim and permitted General Electric to
pursue its claim under a theory of tort liability.
Gilbert is important because it acknowledged the standard first
mentioned in Bowe that unions and employers appear to have an
affirmative obligation to resist the inclusion in future contracts of
any provisions that are illegal at the time of the agreement and,
further, to attempt to effect changes in the terms of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement once it becomes apparent that the
said terms violate the law. The case also raises the possible anomalous situation of an employer shifting its liability to a union whose
funds consist, at least in part, of dues collected from the victims of
the employer's discrimination. If General Electric successfully
counterclaims against the I.U.E. for a right of contribution and the
82.
83.
416 F.2d
84.

49 F.R.D. 162, 2 F.E.P. Cases 602 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
272 F. Supp. 332, 1 F.E.P. Cases 201 (S.D. Ind. 1967), modified on other grounds,
711, 2 F.E.P. Cases 121 (7th Cir. 1969).
EEOC Decision No. 71-1474, 3 F.E.P. Cases 588 (1971).
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plaintiffs, female members of the union, prevail, the victims of the
discriminatory practices may be contributing to their own relief.
There is a serious question whether an injured party should be compelled to contribute to the payment of his own damages. Practically,
will such a precedent discourage unions from pursuing the enforcement of the rights of its members? More specifically, will the rank
and file membership of a union permit the dissipation of union
funds for the benefit of a minority of its members when the union
must ultimately contribute a portion of the damages awarded the
individual plaintiffs?
Moreover, the holding in Gilbert raises many questions concerning the collective-bargaining relationship of employees and unions with regard to equal employment opportunity. Perhaps the
issue can best be explored in two phases: first, the situation before
the government becomes involved in charges 6f discriminatory employment practices; and second, after the government engages in
the enforcement of rights of the employees who have been the victims of such practices.
Prior to the initiation of enforcement proceedings pursuant to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Executive Order 11,246, and the Equal
Pay Act, the relationship between employers and unions with regard
to employment practices is within the exclusive domain of the National Labor Relations Act. The NLRA has been construed to impose upon an exclusive bargaining representative a duty of fair representation which is owed to all members of the bargaining unit. '
Where a union breaches its duty of fair representation, a court may
grant damages or injunctive relief and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) may revoke the union's certification or refuse to
apply the contract bar rule under section 9(c)(3) of the NLRA. 6 If
a breach of the duty of fair representation is held to be an unfair
labor practice, under section 8 of the NLRA, 7 the Board also has
authority to issue a cease and desist order.
The Supreme Court, however, has never resolved the question
whether a breach of duty of fair representation is an unfair labor
practice.', Not until MirandaFuel Co., 9 in 1962, did the Board hold
85. Syres v. Oil Workers, 350 U.S. 892 (1955); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S.
192 (1944) (Railway Labor Act).
86. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970) provides that: "No election shall be directed in any
bargaining unit or any subdivision within which, in the preceding twelve-month period, a

valid election shall have been held."
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1970).
88. Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the direct question of whether a
breach of the duty of fair representation is an unfair labor practice, dictum in Vaca v. Sipes,
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that breach of the duty of fair representation constituted an unfair
labor practice, and the Second Circuit, splitting three ways, refused
to enforce the Board's order. In 1964, a majority of the Board again
held that breach of the union's duty of fair representation by racial
discrimination was an unfair labor practice. In Independent Metal
Workers Union (Hughes Tool Co.),9" the Board found that the failure of a local union of white members to process the grievance of a
black employee was a per se violation of sections 8(b)(1), (2), and
(3) . 1 On the other side, Packinghouse Workers v. National Labor
Relations Board,12 held that employer discrimination based upon
race is likewise an unfair labor practice. However unlike union
discrimination, which is a per se violation of the NLRA, employer
discrimination violates section 8(a)(1)" 3 only where "such discrimination is not merely unjustified, but interferes with or restrains
discriminated employees from exercising their statutory right to act
concertedly for their own aid or protection, as guaranteed by Section
7 of the Act."9 4 The district court held that section 8(a)(1) is violated
where an employer has a policy and practice of discrimination
against its employees on account of their race and such discrimination inhibits said employees from asserting their rights, as guaranteed by the NLRA.
Therefore, employer discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin is not a per se violation of the National Labor Relations Act. Packinghouse Workers was followed in
Jubilee ManufacturingCo.,95 where the Board dismissed a charge of
sex discrimination against the employer based upon disparate wage
rates and increases in pay. The United Steel Workers of America
charged that by paying women lower wages than men in the same
job classification, the company was committing an unfair labor
practice under sections 8(a)(1) and (3). The majority of the Board
386 U.S.- 171 (1967), states that a state court has jurisdiction over suits involving, inter alia,
an alleged breach of the duty of fair representation, conduct which is arguably an unfair labor
practice. In deciding that § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)
confers jurisdiction upon courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements even though it is
necessary to prove an unfair labor practice by the union, the Court recognized, at least
inferentially, that a breach of the duty. of fair representation is an unfair labor practice.
89. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
90. 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964) (3-2 decision).
91. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1)-(3) (1970).
92. 169 N.L.R.B. 290 (1968), afl'd and remandedfor further proceedings, 416 F.2d 1126
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
94. 416 F.2d at 1135.
95. 202 N.L.R.B: No. 2, 83 L.R.R.M. 1482 (Mar. 8, 1973).
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ruled that invidious discrimination, standing alone, is not inherently destructive of workers' self-organizational rights under section
7 of the NLRA. Instead, "[t]here must be actual evidence, as opposed to speculation, of a nexus between the alleged discriminatory
conduct and the interference with, or restraint of, employees in the
exercise of those rights protected by the Act.""
While the holding in Jubilee Manufacturing is consistent with
PackinghouseWorkers, it-should be noted that these cases create an
interesting possibility. The issue in Jubilee Manufacturingwas alleged sex discrimination, more particularly, a dual rate schedule for
payments of compensation to men and women. This was also a
major issue in AT&T. While proof of an employer's invidious discrimination alone will not sustain an unfair labor practice charge
before the Board, it is clear that a federal equal employment agency
could subsequently institute enforcement proceedings against an
employer with a discriminatory rate schedule similar to Jubilee's as
violative of the Civil Rights Act, Executive Order 11,246, and the
Equal Pay Act.
There is a disparity of policies between the Board and the federal equal employment agencies that is difficult to resolve inasmuch
as they apparently have concurrent jurisdiction in employment discrimination cases. The question whether the NLRB was deprived of
jurisdiction in the area of racial discrimination by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was considered in Packinghouse Workers.
In an extensive footnote, 97 the court not only noted that Title VII is
silent concerning whether the Board is ousted from jurisdiction in
these matters but also cited the legislative history of Title VII to
demonstrate that the Board was not meant to be so affected. The
court concluded that the Board has concurrent jurisdiction with the
EEOC and, furthermore, that there is concurrent jurisdiction
among federal equal employment agencies to remedy discrimination
in employment in federal programs under Executive Order 11,246
and the Equal Pay Act. While the federal equal employment agencies and the Board share jurisdiction concurrently, the NLRB is
motivated by a desire to protect the collective bargaining process as
a means of eliminating industrial strife and the federal equal employment agencies are striving for the elimination of discriminatory
employment patterns sometimes perpetuated and effectuated
through collective bargaining agreements. A disparity of policies is
inevitable.
96.
97.

Id. 83 L.R.R.M. at 1484.
416 F.2d at 1133 n.11.
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The National Labor Relations Act creates a duty to bargain
over "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.""5 Refusal to bargain over these subjects is a refusal to bargain under the NLRA, per se, without regard to any issue of good
faith." However, where an employer refuses to bargain with a labor
organization on the basis that the union practices racial discrimination, there is no duty to bargain. In NLRB v. Mansion House
Corp.,10° the Eighth Circuit, citing the fifth amendment, held that
where a union is practicing racial discrimination and seeks to force
the employer to bargain, the remedial machinery of the National
Labor Relations Act cannot be invoked. The case represents an
attempt to bridge the sometimes disparate action of federal agencies
by limiting the overlapping jurisdiction. As noted above, however,
these agencies should properly be expected to have different thrusts
and purposes because the statutes creating them were designed to
further differing interests that, although they may at times be in
conflict, need not result in irreconcilable conflict. It may be that the
noble intent of MansionHouse will come to haunt the future development of both the labor-management relationship and equal employment opportunity.
The court's failure in Mansion House to provide guidelines by
which the Board may deter an employer from improperly refusing
to bargain with an authorized union on the pretext that the union
is practicing racial discrimination raises serious questions. It leaves
the door open for an employer to raise the issue of racial discrimination as a means of avoiding its duty to bargain when the union seeks
to bargain about any subject, even those totally unrelated to the
union's alleged discriminatory practices. In fact, in Mansion House
the record demonstrated that during negotiation meetings the company did not mention discriminatory practices to the union as the
reason for its refusal to bargain. The Board's refusal to compel a
party to bargain on the grounds of discrimination may lead to future
labor unrest and a heightening of racial tension."'1
98. National Labor Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
99. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
100. 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973).
101. The court of appeals in Mansion House cites a Columbia Law Review article to
the contrary. Sovern, The National Labor Relations Act and Racial Discrimination, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 563, 607-08 (1962). This article theorizes that although there is nothing in
the law to prevent a union from striking to force an employer to bargain with it, when given
a choice between abandoning racist policies and risking their certification in recognition
strikes, some unions will choose to cease discriminating. The article also suggests that a policy
of racial discrimination is usually the choice of the local union rather than the international
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The most serious problem with Mansion House may be the
procedural difficulties that could arise out of it. Will the NLRB hold
a hearing on the question of discrimination when it is raised as a
defense to a refusal to bargain charge? What about employer discrimination, which can take very sophisticated forms, as we saw in
Bethlehem and AT&T; will the Board attempt to deal with those
issues if a union refuses to bargain on the grounds that to do so on
a particular issue is to further employer discrimination? Will a
Board determination on racial, ethnic, or sexual discrimination be
reopened by the courts in dealing with Title VII or Executive Order
11,246 matters? Should a Board ruling of employer discrimination
result in a determination that the employer is a non-responsible
contractor for the purpose of federal procurement?' 2 Must the
Board respect the rulings of federal district courts on discrimination
matters as well as a court of appeals? What about determinations
of the EEOC or the Department of Labor? On the other side of the
equation dealing with NLRB involvement in discrimination matters
is the fact that the Board is already involved in these matters via
the route of Hughes Tool, Miranda, Packinghouse Workers, and
Jubilee. The Board already has before it the difficult problems of
meshing its role with that of the equal employment agencies. The
camel's nose is under the tent; the fifth amendment may require the
camel to enter the tent and bed down.
The cases discussed above concerned matters arising prior to
the involvement of the federal government in the employment practices of an employer or labor organization. Problems may also arise
after the government becomes involved. SavannahPrintingSpecialties & PaperProducts,Local 604 v. Union Camp Corp.,"3 grew out
of a refusal of Union Camp Corporation to arbitrate a grievance filed
by several members of the plaintiff union. The grievance concerned
seniority and layoff procedures implemented by the company's affirmative action program established in compliance with standards
set forth by the Department of Labor and approved by the Office
of Federal Contract Compliance. The union contended that the
collective-bargaining agreement requires arbitration of grievances
involving seniority and layoff and relied upon the policy reflected
and the withholding of support by the Board would seriously inhibit organizational efforts
causing the internationals to exert greater pressure to pull stray locals into line. Thus, the
article concludes the result might be new nondiscriminatory policies for labor organizations
which formerly practiced racial discrimination rather than new labor unrest.
102. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1973).
103. 350 F. Supp. 632 (S.D. Ga. 1972).
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in the NLRA and decisions emphasizing the proper role of the court
when a party refuses to arbitrate."0 ' The court held, however, that
"[i]f arbitration can result in obstructing or thwarting the eradication of racial discrimination in employment, an employer is not
forced to go through with it."' ° It further stated that the seniority
provisions in question were entered into under the laws of the
United States and pursuant to its public policy and cannot be diluted by private negotiations or arbitration. Even though the company's change in the seniority provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement was unilateral, the court held that Union Camp properly
refused to arbitrate the grievances. The decision indicates that an
employer can unilaterally implement an affirmative action plan
required by the government and thereafter need not submit issues
concerning the required changes in the collective-bargaining agreement to arbitration. In addition, it is now settled law that management and labor cannot contract between themselves to avoid the
obligations mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Executive
Order 11,246. o6 A union could react to this decision by striking
against an employer who implements an affirmative action program
approved by the government, but the employer may be able to
enjoin such a strike since Title VII permits a court to enjoin unlawful employment practices.0 7 The Act also exempts civil actions
brought under Title VII from the anti-injunction proscription of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act.'0 Thus, Title VII and, by analogy, Executive
Order 11,246, may enable an employer to enjoin a work stoppage
directed at opposing the implementation of an affirmative action
plan.
V.

CONCLUSION

The affirmative action mandate has been carried forward in
various formats. The Contract Compliance Program was developed
as a means of realizing equal opportunity in the employment practices of employers doing business with the federal government. The
thrust of the Program is to increase the utilization of minorities and
104. In 1960 the Supreme Court decided a series of cases known as the Steelworkers
Trilogy dealing with the enforcement of arbitration clauses. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960).
105. 350 F. Supp. at 636.
106. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 854 (1971).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. 1973).
108. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(h) (1970).
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women throughout the employer's work force. The Program requires
that an employer seeking to do business with the federal government must take affirmative action toward the elimination of discriminatory employment practices through established federal contract procurement law.
The ContractorsAssociation of EasternPennsylvania decision
and other case law established the legality of the Contract Compliance Program under the broad procurement authority delegated to
the executive branch of government. ContractorsAssociation of
Eastern Pennsylvaniaalso provided legal support for the concept of
goals and timetables for the recruitment of minority persons as a
means of implementing the affirmative action mandate of Executive Order 11,246.
Case law under Executive Order 11,246 has resulted in the recognition of an expansive definition of discrimination that includes
employment practices that, though neutral on their face, have the
effect of perpetuating past discriminatory treatment. The AT&T
Memorandum of Agreement not only applied an expansive concept
of discrimination, but also fashioned creative remedial relief
through the interaction of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Executive Order 11,246, and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.
On the other hand, Bethlehem and AT&T raised many issues
concerning the impact of these enforcement proceedings upon the
collective-bargaining process, including the role of the collectivebargaining representative in negotiations between employers and
the government; the right of an employer to seek contribution from
a union when sued by an employee for alleged discriminatory employment practices that are established pursuant to a collectivebargaining agreement; and the vast number of issues involving the
effect of affirmative action requirements upon the rights of the parties to a collective-bargaining agreement as regulated by the NLRA.
These and other problems require a sensitivity to the valid
interests of the parties while effectively enforcing the equally vital
goal of abolishing employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin. To this end, the Department of
Labor and the other federal equal employment opportunity agencies
are firmly committed to the affirmative action mandate.

[Vol. 27

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

114

APPENDIX I

z
z
0

"S2
z \

z

C.C)

0

04

o

o

'
0)
0,4-..

0o

Pr.

z

E-0O0

0

C3 a)

o0

I~

to
xi
to

02

I00III
,)i

g

C.)

0

co

1974]

CIVIL RIGHTS PROBLEMS
APPENDIX II
EXAMPLES OF WAGE TREATMENT
UPON PROMOTION

SOUTHWESTERN BELL
Wage at
42 mos.
service

Wage after
promotion to
top craft

Grade 2 Clerk
(6397 employees99.7% female)

131.50/wk

140.50/wk

Frameman
(1309 employees12.2% female)

175.50/wk

175.50/wk

Total wages lost over 42 month period-$5616
Frameman reaches top craft pay after 60 months NCS.
Clerk reaches top craft pay after 84 months NCS.
PACIFIC TEL. AND TEL.
Wage at
42 mos.
service

Wage after
promotion to
top craft

Operator
(19,467 employees97.5% female)

133.00/wk

153.00/wk

Frameman
(2274 employees11.0% female)

159.00/wk

167.00/wk

Total wages lost over 42 month period-$2678
Frameman reaches top craft after 72 months NCS.
Operator reaches top craft after 84 months NCS.
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